For the love of joint operations, we have to stop hiding behind abbreviations

For the love of joint operations, we have to stop hiding behind abbreviations

. 5 minutter å lese

Aleksander Fredriksen

Hovedlærer i fellesoperasjoner ved Stabsskolen. Mastergrad fra den Svenske Försvarshögskolan, samt en MBA i Sikkerhetsledelse og kulturforståelse fra BI.

After years of watching this in multinational headquarters, this is my plea to the joint military community: Stop mistaking insider language for clear communication.

The modern military loves compression. Timelines, decisions, language. We compress until a briefing becomes a dense block of insider speech. Acronyms sound professional, even sophisticated. But compression is not clarity.

I understand the appeal. Abbreviations save time, compress complexity, and tell us we belong to the same tribe. I’ve used them myself. I’ve also nodded along in briefings without fully understanding every acronym. You can sound like you belong and still miss the point.

Inside a branch or specialty, familiar shorthand can work well. Its meaning is already shared, so less effort goes into decoding it—not zero effort, but less. Some abbreviations travel just as well across specialties. I have no quarrel with those. The test is whether the whole audience shares an unambiguous meaning, not whether the speaker thinks everyone ought to know it.

At the joint level, that assumption breaks down. Different disciplines, branches, and nations have to contribute and receive information. In my experience, a common understanding of any given abbreviation can be the exception rather than the rule. Your tribe may understand you perfectly. The room may not.

Acronyms feel efficient to the speaker and their tribe. When their meaning is unfamiliar, the audience pays. The complexity has not disappeared; the burden of processing it has moved across the room. At worst, this can come across as a way of asserting dominance or hiding a lack of competence behind insider language, even when that is not the speaker’s intention.

Take a deliberately simple illustration: The presenter saves one second, but fifty listeners each spend two extra seconds working out the meaning (sometimes a lot more). That is a hundred seconds of cumulative decoding effort. Not a measured effect, and not a hundred-second delay to the briefing. Just a reminder that the speaker’s stopwatch is the wrong measure of efficiency.

Because there is a limit to what we can hold in mind. Cowan (2001) puts short-term memory capacity at about four meaningful units, or “chunks,” on average when rehearsal and regrouping are constrained. That is not a fixed limit for a military briefing. My concern is simpler: attention spent working out the shorthand is attention unavailable for the message. That is where we need our mental effort, understanding the situation, weighing options, and planning what to do. War is complicated enough without making the language, and made-up words, another problem to solve.

And some colleagues are doing this in a language that is not their mother tongue, like me. That matters in multinational headquarters, including those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Borghini and Hazan (2018) found greater listening effort among non-native listeners understanding speech in background noise, even at matched comprehension levels. It does not follow that every non-native speaker carries twice the cognitive load. But unfamiliar acronyms can, in my view, add another layer: follow the working language, then decode the specialty’s shorthand. Why add a burden we can avoid?

Nor is a definition at the start necessarily enough. Shulman et al. (2020) found that jargon made scientific information harder to process fluently even when definitions were provided. It affected readers’ identification with the science community and, through that, their self-reported interest and perceived understanding. They were studying science communication, not military headquarters. Still, I would keep that finding in mind before assuming one explanation has done the job, and again putting the burden on the listener.

Then there is the factor of belonging. Levy and Reiche (2018) argue that cultural capital, the knowledge and ways of behaving an organisation values, can shape status and draw boundaries between groups. Their framework concerns multinational corporations, not military headquarters or acronyms. But I recognise the pattern. Our shorthand can mark out the different tribes, insiders and outsiders, apparent experts and non-experts, veterans and newcomers.

Joint headquarters need people who are outsiders to one another’s specialties. The air officer, the intelligence analyst, the logistician, the civilian adviser: we bring them together for their different perspectives, not because they speak alike. Yet, in my experience, linguistic conformity too often earns more recognition than operational insight. If sounding like an insider is the price of being heard, what are we failing to hear?

But I must stress, that I do not think this is necessarily deliberate exclusion. We inherit it. Holmes (2022), drawing on Orwell in his commentary on military jargon, describes unclear language as a habit spread through imitation, and one we can, and should, change. That rings true to me. We learn how the tribe speaks, teach newcomers to do the same, and eventually stop noticing the barrier. Familiarity starts passing for competence.

Those habits do not stay inside the headquarters. Holmes (2022) describes naval leaders being challenged by lawmakers for failing to explain themselves in plain language. My worry is that we become so accustomed to speaking within the tribe that we struggle to speak outside it, to politicians and the public. We can go so far into our own shorthand that we stop noticing how little it conveys to anyone else. Then the language that makes us sound credible internally gets in the way of explaining what we do, why it matters, and what we need.

The risk, as I see it, is practical. Misunderstandings can slow decisions, blur intent, and create friction we could have avoided. In military operations, the consequences can be serious. Clarity is part of managing that risk.

“We need to break down silos.” I hear it from so many people discussing multi-domain operations that it has almost become a mantra. Yet we still seem to reach for technology first. Connecting systems matters. So does connecting the people who interpret the information, challenge assumptions, and plan together. Shared language is a simple integration mechanism. In my experience, it gets far less attention.

We are building multi-domain headquarters while speaking single-domain dialects. Start there. Make your expertise understandable beyond your own specialty. No amount of technical connectivity relieves us of that responsibility.

Use fewer unnecessary abbreviations. Explain in plain language. Make it safe to ask, “What does that mean?” And when someone asks again, explain again without irritation. Check understanding; do not infer it from a room full of nodding heads.

I am not asking for a ban. Keep the abbreviations that genuinely work for the whole audience. But stop treating insider language as proof of professionalism or a shortcut to planning. We need the gains, not the appearance of efficiency: shared understanding, coordinated action, and plans people can execute.

An acronym may make perfect sense to someone. The problem is that modern military operations are no longer conducted by “someone”, they conducted by all the tribes.  And if only your own tribe understands you, your language is not enabling integration. It is getting in the way.

And if you do not see that as a problem, you might be part of it.

Author’s note: English is not my first language. I used AI assistance to improve the clarity and flow of the English in this article. The arguments and judgments are my own, and I remain responsible for the final text.

REFERENCES

Borghini, G., & Hazan, V. (2018). Listening effort during sentence processing is increased for non-native listeners: A pupillometry study. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 12, Article 152. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2018.00152

Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of mental storage capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(1), 87–114. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X01003922

Holmes, J. (2022, March 7). The US military has a problem: An addiction to buzzwords and jargon. 19FortyFive. https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/03/the-us-military-has-a-problem-an-addiction-to-buzzwords-and-jargon/

Levy, O., & Reiche, B. S. (2018). The politics of cultural capital: Social hierarchy and organizational architecture in the multinational corporation. Human Relations, 71(6), 867–894. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726717729208

Shulman, H. C., Dixon, G. N., Bullock, O. M., & Colón Amill, D. (2020). The effects of jargon on processing fluency, self-perceptions, and scientific engagement. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 39(5–6), 579–597. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X20902177

Foto: Johanne Søstuen / Forsvaret


Aleksander Fredriksen

Hovedlærer i fellesoperasjoner ved Stabsskolen. Mastergrad fra den Svenske Försvarshögskolan, samt en MBA i Sikkerhetsledelse og kulturforståelse fra BI.

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